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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Background and context 
The foreign policy pursued by President George W. Bush since the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001 has attracted much controversy and condemnation. He has been 
accused of presiding over a revolution in American grand strategy, but is this really 
the case? 
 
Two broad themes frame academic debate on the Bush doctrine: whether the doctrine 
is a departure from past U.S. foreign policy, or consistent with past practice; and 
whether the doctrine represents a coherent strategic response to 9/11, or an 
ineffective, even dangerous, reaction to the terrorist attacks. 
 
Many commentators claim that the Bush doctrine marks a fundamental rupture with 
past American grand strategy. Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay argue that the Bush 
administration‟s response to 9/11 “discarded or redefined many of the key principles 
governing the way the United States should act overseas”, rejecting international law 
and the policies of containment and deterrence in favour of “the unilateral exercise of 
American power” and “a proactive doctrine of preemption”.1 James Mann agrees that 
the Bush national security team has transformed U.S. foreign relations: “the Vulcans 
managed to set down an entire new set of ideas and principles. They were deliberately 
choosing to create a new conception of American foreign policy, just as the Truman 
                                                 
1
 Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy 
(Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 2. 
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administration had constructed a new framework of ideas and institutions at the 
beginning of the cold war.”2  
 
Others have attempted to place the Bush doctrine in historical context. John Lewis 
Gaddis offers the most cogent attempt to find continuity, suggesting that the concepts 
of “pre-emption, unilateralism and hegemony” were crucial to past American grand 
strategies and that they are “surprisingly relevant” again.3 Similarly, Melvyn Leffler 
argues that there is “more continuity than change” in the Bush doctrine, and that the 
president‟s “rhetoric and actions have deep roots in the history of American foreign 
policy.”4 
 
Argument overview 
The central argument advanced in this dissertation is that the Bush doctrine is not only 
consistent with past American grand strategy but also, in both a conceptual and 
practical sense, a logical strategic response to 9/11. In subsequent chapters, I compare 
each component of the Bush doctrine (democracy promotion, prevention, 
unilateralism, and hegemony) with U.S. grand strategy under President Bill Clinton 
and, in a broader context, Cold War American foreign policy, thereby placing the 
Bush administration‟s national security strategy in historical perspective. Ultimately, I 
contend that the Bush doctrine should be interpreted as a grand strategy that embodies 
far more continuity than change. 
 
                                                 
2
 James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet (New York: Penguin Books, 
2004), 330. 
3
 John Lewis Gaddis, Surprise, Security, and the American Experience (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2004), 13. 
4
 Melvyn P. Leffler, “9/11 and American Foreign Policy,” Diplomatic History 29, no. 3 (June 2005): 
395. 
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Chapter outline 
Chapter 1 defines the terms grand strategy and presidential doctrine. It also defines 
the Clinton and Bush doctrines, thereby providing a conceptual framework for 
subsequent analysis.  
 
Chapter 2 argues that Bush‟s policy of democracy promotion should be understood 
as a rational strategic reaction to 9/11 that is entirely consistent with past American 
foreign policy. I contend that the Clinton and Bush democracy promotion strategies 
demonstrate the enduring influence of American nationalism on U.S. foreign policy.  
 
Chapter 3 reasons that Bush‟s critics have overstated the centrality and scope of 
prevention in current American grand strategy. I explore examples of preventive logic 
in U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War and Clinton years, thus placing Bush‟s 
strategy of prevention in context, before arguing for the inevitability of the 2003 Iraq 
war.  
 
Chapter 4 asserts that charges of unilateralism levelled at the Bush administration are 
largely false. U.S. grand strategy is rarely entirely unilateral or multilateral; instead, 
American presidents must blend both in a manner that advances U.S. interests. In 
recognising the utility of collective action, while placing American interests ahead of 
multilateral procedure, Bush does not depart from past practice.  
 
Chapter 5 argues that, in asserting American hegemony, the Bush administration 
seeks security, not empire. As a strategy founded on the notion that American 
 4  
interests are advanced through the expansion of U.S. power overseas, the Bush 
doctrine conforms to American foreign policy since the beginning of the Cold War. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
PRESIDENTIAL DOCTRINES AND AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY 
 
 
1.1 Grand Strategy 
 
Interpretations of the term grand strategy vary. For John Mearsheimer, the term refers 
purely to a state‟s military capacity to combat national security threats.5 Barry Posen 
and Andrew Ross endorse a wider definition that includes the military, political, and 
economic means utilised by a state to counter security threats.
6
 Both definitions 
recognise that a grand strategy is a calculated response to a specific threat; they differ, 
however, on the range of instruments of statecraft that should be included within the 
sphere of grand strategy. The danger of employing too broad a definition, as Colin 
Dueck notes, “is that it leaves the term without any distinct meaning or utility.”7 
Equally, however, too narrow a definition will offer an incomplete illustration of 
American national security strategy. President Bush, for example, has not used 
exclusively military means to combat the threat of international terrorism; instead, 
Bush, like his immediate predecessor, has invoked American diplomatic and 
economic, as well as military, power to meet security threats. 
 
A broad definition of grand strategy will provide a more accurate narrative of 
continuity and change in American foreign policy since 9/11. Robert Lieber offers a 
comprehensive definition, reasoning that the term explains “how a country will 
employ the various tools it possesses – military, economic, political, technological, 
ideological, and cultural – to protect its overall security, values, and national 
                                                 
5
 John J. Mearsheimer, Liddell Hart and the Weight of History (London: Brassey‟s Defence Publishers, 
1988), 17. 
6
 Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy,” International 
Security 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996-1997): 5-53. 
7
 Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 10. 
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interests.”8 Essentially, therefore, a grand strategy is a state-level attempt to balance 
the relationship between means and ends in the realm of foreign relations. 
 
It is useful to consider typologies for change in grand strategy. Charles Kupchan 
differentiates between “accommodationist,” “defensive,” and “expansionist” 
strategies.
9
 It is doubtful, however, that American grand strategy can be characterised 
in such rigid terms. Dueck‟s concept of “strategic adjustment,” defined as a process of 
dramatic expansion or contraction in “overall strategic capabilities and 
commitments,” offers a more practical framework within which to analyse change and 
continuity in grand strategy.
10
 It is this study‟s central proposition that there has been 
minimal “strategic adjustment” in American national security strategy since 9/11; 
instead, the core tenets of the Bush doctrine were evident in Clinton‟s grand strategy 
and, in a broader historical context, American foreign policy during the Cold War. 
 
 
1.2 Presidential Doctrines 
 
A presidential doctrine is a succinct statement of grand strategy. As H. W. Brands 
puts it, “the greatest effect of presidential doctrines is to summarize policies in a few 
words.”11 In this respect, the Bush doctrine does not set a precedent: from James 
Monroe to Ronald Reagan, presidential doctrines have conveyed the fundamental 
guiding principles of United States foreign policy.  
 
                                                 
8
 Robert J. Lieber, The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21
st
 Century (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 40. 
9
 Charles Kupchan, Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 67-68. 
10
 Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders, 12. 
11
 H. W. Brands, “Presidential Doctrines: An Introduction,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 36, no. 1 
(March 2006): 3. 
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Presidential doctrines serve a dual purpose: they allow policymakers to rationalise the 
strategic decision-making process; and they express the foreign policy intentions of a 
specific U.S. administration, both to the American public and Congress and 
governments abroad. However, they also encourage simplistic, often caricatured, 
narratives of American grand strategy; a tendency that is evident in much of the 
academic and journalistic analysis of the Bush administration‟s foreign policy. For 
instance, the Bush doctrine is often equated with preventive war and unilateralism; yet 
many of Bush‟s critics overstate the centrality of these concepts to current American 
security policy. As Stanley Renshon points out, the doctrine “is much wider in scope 
than any of the singular elements for which it is criticized.”12 The Bush doctrine 
should instead be interpreted as a comprehensive “conceptual and strategic response 
to a set of important national security issues that the United States faces in the post-
9/11 world.”13  
 
 
1.3 The Clinton Doctrine 
 
President Clinton is often criticised for failing to define a clear threat around which to 
formulate post-Cold War American grand strategy. Charles Krauthammer has labelled 
the 1990s a “holiday from history” in which the dangers posed by rogue states and 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation “grew more acute” while the 
Clinton administration failed to act.
14
 Henry Kissinger has echoed these sentiments: 
“For a decade, the democracies had progressively fallen prey to the illusion that 
                                                 
12
 Stanley A. Renshon, “The Bush Doctrine Considered,” in Understanding the Bush Doctrine: 
Psychology and Strategy in an Age of Terrorism, ed. Stanley A. Renshon and Peter Suedfeld (New 
York: Routledge, 2007), 2. 
13
 Ibid. 2 
14
 Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment Revisited,” National Interest, 70 (Winter 2002/2003): 
6. 
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threats from abroad had virtually disappeared; that dangers, if any, were primarily 
psychological or sociological in origin”.15  
 
It is important to acknowledge the unique international context in which Clinton 
occupied the White House. The collapse of the Soviet Union signified the 
disappearance of the raison d’etre for American overseas engagement during the 
previous fifty years; consequently, despite its overwhelming preponderance of power, 
there was little intellectual consensus on how America should engage with the rest of 
the world. Stephen Walt terms this situation the “paradox of unipolarity”.16 The lack 
of a clear and present danger to American national security immediately after the 
Cold War undermined Clinton‟s attempts to enunciate a logical purpose for American 
power. As John Dumbrell notes, the “confusion and strategic uncertainty” of the 
1990s were not “conducive to presidential grand theorizing.”17 
 
Nonetheless, considerable blame for the lack of vision in American grand strategy 
during the 1990s must be apportioned to the Clinton administration itself. A failure to 
clearly define the U.S. national interest has led Michael Mandelbaum to characterise 
American foreign policy during the Clinton presidency as “social work,”18 while 
Joshua Muravchik has condemned Clinton‟s chronic vacillation, accusing the former 
president of “carrying a small stick.”19 William Hyland provides a particularly cogent 
summation of the foreign policy-making process during the Clinton years: “In the 
                                                 
15
 Henry Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21
st
 Century 
(London: The Free Press, 2002), 289. 
16
 Stephen Walt, “Two Cheers for Clinton‟s Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 79, no. 2 (March/April 
2000): 65. 
17
 John Dumbrell, “Was There a Clinton Doctrine? President Clinton‟s Foreign Policy Reconsidered,” 
Diplomacy & Statecraft 13, no. 2 (June 2002): 45. 
18
 Michael Mandelbaum, “Foreign Policy as Social Work,” Foreign Affairs 75, no. 1 (January/February 
1996): 16-32. 
19
 Joshua Muravchik, “Carrying a Small Stick,” National Review 48, no. 16 (September 2 1996): 57-61. 
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absence of an overall perspective, most issues were bound to degenerate into tactical 
manipulations, some successful some not. Clinton stumbled from crisis to crisis, 
trying to figure out…what choices would pose the lowest risk to his presidency.”20 As 
the identification of an unambiguous strategic threat is a fundamental component of 
any grand strategy, it could be argued that Clinton failed to articulate a substantive 
foreign policy doctrine. Dumbrell‟s attempt to locate a Clinton doctrine, and in the 
process identifying five possible candidates, seems to support this conclusion.
21
 
 
However, strategic inconsistencies do not necessarily preclude the existence of a 
Clinton doctrine; as Brands notes, it is possible for a doctrine to be one “in name 
rather than in fact.”22 Optimistic appraisals of Clinton‟s foreign policy identify two 
plausible candidates for the title of Clinton doctrine: the policy of “democratic 
enlargement” and the strategic desire to nullify the threats posed by rogue states to 
American interests.
23
 Although Gaddis Smith quipped that the concept was “banality 
on stilts,”24 “democratic enlargement” probably represents the most convincing 
characterisation of Clinton‟s grand strategy. For Douglas Brinkley, the concept 
endorses “the notion that as free states grew in number and strength the international 
order would become both more prosperous and more secure.”25 Despite the short-
lived relevance of the label itself, the underlying rationale behind “democratic 
enlargement” is a logical progression from Cold War containment and continues to 
inform American foreign policy under George W. Bush.  
                                                 
20
 William Hyland, Clinton’s World: Remaking American Foreign Policy (London: Praeger, 1999), 
203. 
21
 Dumbrell, “Was There a Clinton Doctrine?” 43-56. 
22
 Brands, “Presidential Doctrines,” 1. 
23
 Douglas Brinkley, “Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine,” Foreign Policy, no. 106 
(Spring 1997): 110-127; Dumbrell, “Was There a Clinton Doctrine?” 43-56.  
24
 Gaddis Smith quoted in “Clinton‟s Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy, no. 121 (November/December 
2000): 18. 
25
 Brinkley, “Democratic Enlargement,” 116. 
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The Clinton administration‟s rogue state policy has also been suggested as a feasible 
Clinton doctrine. Dumbrell makes the compelling point that a rogue state doctrine is 
the most credible candidate because it delineates a clear strategic threat to American 
security, a vital feature of any grand strategy.
26
 Thus, in proposing a Clinton doctrine, 
this study will unite two objectives of Clinton‟s national security strategy: the 
dissemination of democratic values abroad; and the eradication of the dangers posed 
by rogue regimes to U.S. security. Whether the Clinton doctrine was successfully 
implemented will not be dealt with here; instead, the aim of this study is to expose the 
striking degree of thematic continuity between the Clinton and Bush national security 
strategies. 
 
 
1.4 The Bush Doctrine 
 
President Bush has proposed a comparatively consistent vision for American grand 
strategy. For Gaddis, there is “a coherence in the Bush strategy that the Clinton 
national security team…never achieved.”27 Consequently, defining the Bush doctrine 
is a somewhat simpler task.  
 
The Bush administration does not publicly endorse the term Bush doctrine, so its 
content is open to interpretation. Peter Dombrowski and Rodger Payne contend that 
the doctrine refers exclusively to the right to employ preemptive military force against 
rogue regimes that sponsor terrorism and seek to obtain WMD.
28
 However, such a 
limited definition offers an incomplete portrayal of Bush‟s national security policy. 
                                                 
26
 Dumbrell, “Was There a Clinton Doctrine?” 54. 
27
 John Lewis Gaddis, “A Grand Strategy of Transformation,” Foreign Policy, no. 133 
(November/December 2002): 54. 
28
 Peter Dombrowski and Rodger A. Payne, “Global Debate and the Limits of the Bush Doctrine,” 
International Studies Perspectives 4, no. 4 (November 2003): 395-408. 
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As Renshon points out, preemption “is an option, but not a doctrine by itself.”29 
Instead, the Bush doctrine should be understood as a broad strategic response to the 
threats posed to American national security by the combination of international 
terrorism, rogue states, and WMD proliferation. A broader definition is therefore 
required. 
 
This study will employ Robert Jervis‟ definition of the Bush doctrine because it 
incorporates the most salient features of post-9/11 American foreign policy. For 
Jervis, the doctrine consists of four key elements: 
 
“A strong belief in the importance of a state‟s domestic regime in determining 
its foreign policy and the related judgment that this is an opportune time to 
transform international politics; the perception of great threats that can be 
defeated only by new and vigorous policies, most notably preventive war; a 
willingness to act unilaterally when necessary; and, as both a cause and a 
summary of these beliefs, an overriding sense that peace and stability require 
the United States to assert its primacy in world politics.”30  
 
 
Bush‟s detractors from both Left and Right contend that the emergence of the Bush 
doctrine can be attributed to the influence of a “cabal” of neoconservatives on the 
Bush administration. Conservatives Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke allege “the 
neo-conservatives have taken American international relations on an unfortunate 
detour, veering away from the balanced, consensus-building, and resource-
husbanding approach that has characterized traditional Republican 
internationalism.”31 Liberal internationalist Michael Lind claims the doctrine is a 
discredited “neoconservative fantasy of unilateral global hegemony” that will fade 
                                                 
29
 Renshon, “The Bush Doctrine Considered,” 2.   
30
 Robert Jervis, “Understanding the Bush Doctrine,” Political Science Quarterly 118, no. 3 (Fall 
2003): 365. 
31
 Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, American Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 9. 
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away when Bush leaves office.
32
 More recently, it has been erroneously argued that 
the neoconservatives form one component of a powerful “Israel lobby” that has 
manipulated American foreign policy in the Middle East to such an extent as to 
jeopardise U.S. national interests.
33
  
 
This dissertation rejects the notion that current American grand strategy is a 
neoconservative aberration. The Bush doctrine can more accurately be understood as 
a typically American blend of ideals and interests. Robert Singh appropriately 
characterises the doctrine as “an intellectually coherent amalgam of traditional 
„realist‟ approaches to international relations and an expansively muscular 
Wilsonianism.”34 Consequently, the Bush administration has not revolutionised U.S. 
foreign policy; rather, it has merely reaffirmed the principles that motivated past 
American grand strategy. As Robert Kagan puts it, “America did not change on 
September 11. It only became more itself.”35  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32
 Michael Lind, “The world after Bush,” Prospect (November 2006): 36-40. 
33
 John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (London: 
Allen Lane, 2007). 
34
 Robert Singh, “The Bush Doctrine,” in The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism: Global 
Responses, Global Consequences, ed. Mary Buckley and Robert Singh (London: Routledge, 2006), 13. 
35
 Robert Kagan, Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (London: 
Atlantic Books, 2004), 85. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
DEMOCRACY PROMOTION 
 
 
2.1 9/11 and the Middle East 
 
The promotion of democracy in the Middle East is a central component of the Bush 
doctrine. This policy is not attributable to the alleged neoconservative influence on 
the Bush administration. Neoconservatism is not a cohesive political movement; 
accordingly, as Timothy Lynch notes, there is not a uniform set of neoconservative 
prescriptions for American policy in the Middle East.
36
 Bush‟s efforts to spread 
democracy in that region should instead be recognised as a logical strategic response 
to 9/11. As Max Boot suggests, Bush adopted a policy of democracy promotion “not 
because of the impact of the neocons but because of the impact of the four airplanes 
hijacked on September 11, 2001.”37  
 
There is a compelling rationale to Bush‟s democratisation agenda. Following the 
terrorist attacks, the Bush administration reasoned that the Islamic radicalism 
manifested on September 11 was caused by the dominance of authoritarianism in the 
Middle East. “As long as the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not 
flourish,” Bush argued, “it will remain a place of stagnation, resentment, and violence 
ready for export.”38 Bush consequently endorsed a strategy of democracy promotion 
designed to ultimately transform the political composition of the Middle East. The 
Bush administration, as Norman Podhoretz puts it, aims to “drain the swamps” of 
                                                 
36
 Timothy J. Lynch, “Kristol Balls: Neoconservative Visions of Islam and the Middle East,” 
International Politics 45, no. 4 (July 2008): 192. 
37
 Max Boot, “Neocons,” Foreign Policy, no. 140 (January/February 2004): 21. 
38
 George W. Bush, “President Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and Middle East,” November 6, 2003, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html (accessed June 2, 2008). 
 14  
tyranny throughout the region.
39
 Fundamental therefore to Bush‟s analysis of the 
Middle East is the postulation that American security interests are advanced through 
the spread of democratic values overseas. For Bush, “As in Europe, as in Asia, as in 
every region of the world, the advance of freedom leads to peace.”40 
 
This vision is entirely consistent with past American foreign policy. As Leffler 
argues, “Bush‟s goals of sustaining a democratic peace and disseminating America‟s 
core values resonate with the most traditional themes in U.S. history.”41 During the 
Cold War, democracy promotion remained a key theme in United States grand 
strategy. Joseph Nye, for example, characterises democracy promotion as the “default 
option” of American diplomacy during the twentieth century.42 NSC-68, the 
document that shaped U.S. Cold War policy, recognised the importance of democratic 
values in the struggle against the Soviet Union: “It is only by practical affirmation, 
abroad as well as at home, of our essential values, that we can preserve our own 
integrity.”43 In seeking “to create a balance of power that favors human freedom,”44 
the Bush doctrine invokes the traditional objective of furthering U.S. security interests 
through the promotion of democracy beyond American borders.  
 
 
2.2 American National Identity and Democracy Promotion 
 
The tradition of democracy promotion is rooted in the American sense of national 
identity. According to Paul T. McCartney, American nationalism is founded on two 
                                                 
39
 Paul Berman et al. “Defending and Advancing Freedom: A Symposium,” Commentary 120, no. 4 
(November 2005): 56. 
40
 Bush, “President Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and Middle East.” 
41
 Melvyn P. Leffler, “Bush‟s Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy, no. 144 (September/October 2004): 22. 
42
 Leslie H. Gelb et al. “The Freedom Crusade, Revisited,” The National Interest 82 (Winter 
2005/2006): 15. 
43
 NSC-68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, April 7, 1950, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm (accessed June 4, 2008); hereafter, NSC-68. 
44
 The National Security Strategy of the United States, September 17, 2002, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (accessed June 2, 2008); hereafter, 2002 NSS. 
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concepts: universalism and exceptionalism.
45
 The notion of universalism implies that 
American nationalism is distinctly ideological. As Robert Kagan notes, American 
nationalism is not, like most nationalisms, “rooted in blood and soil” but in a 
“common allegiance to the liberal republican ideology.”46 U.S. nationalism is 
therefore distinguished by a universalistic commitment to liberal values and the belief 
that those values are “rooted in qualities and capacities shared by all people, 
everywhere.”47 As Jeane Kirkpatrick observed, “no idea holds greater sway in the 
mind of educated Americans than the belief that it is possible to democratize 
governments, anytime, anywhere, under any circumstances.”48   
 
This ideological universalism gives rise to a sense of American exceptionalism, a 
term defined as the “perception that the United States differs qualitatively from other 
developed nations, because of its unique origins, national credo, historical evolution, 
and distinctive political and religious institutions.”49 For McCartney, American 
exceptionalism demonstrates an “element of superiority,” as it implies that the U.S. is 
both “qualitatively different from – and better than – other states.”50 This perceived 
ideological preeminence engenders a “crusading mentality,” whereby Americans are 
motivated by a sense of mission to spread their political values abroad.
51
 Thus, U.S. 
nationalism is informed by two themes: an ideological universalism in which 
                                                 
45
 Paul T. McCartney, “American Nationalism and U.S. Foreign Policy from September 11 to the Iraq 
War,” Political Science Quarterly 119, no. 3 (2004): 402-406. 
46
 Robert Kagan, Dangerous Nation: American and the World, 1600-1898 (London: Atlantic Books, 
2006), 42. 
47
 McCartney, “American Nationalism,” 402. 
48
 Jeane Kirkpatrick, “Dictatorships and Double Standards,” Commentary 68, no. 5 (November 1979): 
37. 
49
 Harold Hongju Koh, “Foreword: On American Exceptionalism,” Stanford Law Review, 55 (2002-
2003): 1481n. 
50
 McCartney, “American Nationalism,” 403. 
51
 Ibid., 403. 
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American values are perceived to be applicable across the world; and a sense of duty 
to spread those values overseas. 
 
Historically, American national identity has had a profound impact in shaping U.S. 
foreign relations. As Kagan notes, an entrenched commitment to an ideological 
universalism does not complement the traditional European, and distinctly non-
ideological, idea of the national interest: “Americans from the beginning were 
interested not only in protecting and advancing their material well-being; they also 
believed their own fate was in some way tied to the cause of liberalism and 
republicanism both within and beyond their borders.”52 For Samuel Huntington, most 
Americans believe that “foreign policy goals should reflect not only the security 
interests of the nation…but also the political values and principles that define 
American identity.”53 Therefore, U.S. foreign policy is guided not only by an 
ideological universalism, but also by the conviction that America has an exceptional 
role in promoting its values beyond its borders. 
 
 
2.3 Clinton, Bush, and the “End of History” 
 
The influence of American nationalism is evident in the democracy promotion 
strategies of both post-Cold War presidents. The notion of promoting democratic 
ideals abroad did not therefore suddenly emerge after 9/11; instead, an assertive and 
moralistic desire to spread liberal ideals, a tendency Kagan terms a “messianic 
                                                 
52
 Kagan, Dangerous Nation, 42. 
53
 Samuel P. Huntington, “American Ideals versus American Institutions,” Political Science Quarterly 
97, no. 1 (Spring 1982): 19. 
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impulse,”54 is both a defining feature of the American national character and a central 
component of the Bush doctrine. 
 
Following the breakdown of Soviet communism, Francis Fukuyama proclaimed the 
“end of history” in the sense that liberal democracy represented the “end point of 
mankind‟s ideological evolution” and the “final form of human government”.55 The 
perceived victory of the liberal democratic ideal, as expressed by Fukuyama, has 
informed American grand strategy during the Clinton and Bush presidencies. Anthony 
Lake, Clinton‟s National Security Advisor, reasoned in 1993 that “billions of people 
on every continent are simply concluding, based on decades of their own hard 
experience, that democracy and markets are the most productive and liberating ways 
to organize their lives.”56 The Bush administration‟s 2002 National Security Strategy 
(NSS) also affirms the superiority of the liberal democratic model: “The great 
struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a 
decisive victory for the forces of freedom – and a single sustainable model for 
national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise.”57  
 
In regarding democratic ideals as both superior and universally applicable, the Clinton 
and Bush doctrines subscribe to the ideological universalism that is intrinsic to U.S. 
national identity. The tradition of American exceptionalism is equally apparent in the 
Clinton and Bush grand strategies. It was, of course, Clinton‟s Secretary of State who 
declared America the “indispensable nation”. In his first inaugural address, President 
                                                 
54
 Robert Kagan, “Neocon Nation: Neoconservatism, c. 1776,” World Affairs 170, no. 4 (Spring 2008): 
22. 
55
 Francis Fukuyama, introduction to The End of History and the Last Man (London: Penguin Books, 
1992), xi. 
56
 Anthony Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement,” September 21, 1993, 
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/lakedoc.html (accessed June 3, 2008). 
57
 2002 NSS. 
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Clinton defined the United States‟ unique role in spreading democracy: “Our hopes, 
our hearts, our hands are with those on every continent who are building democracy 
and freedom. Their cause is America‟s cause.”58 Similarly, President Bush invoked 
U.S. exceptionalism when he declared that America “will actively work to bring the 
hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the 
globe.”59  
 
The American desire to spread democracy is not motivated purely by altruism; rather, 
the United States seeks to encourage political liberalisation abroad because it 
enhances American security. The strategic rationale for a policy of democracy 
promotion is entirely persuasive. As Robert Kaufman contends, promoting democracy 
is “tried and true and based on one of the few robust theories of international politics 
for which there is abundant empirical confirmation: stable, liberal democracies do not 
go to war with one another.”60 The conviction that the spread of democracy makes 
America safer is fundamental to both the Clinton and Bush doctrines. Clinton‟s 1995 
National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, for example, supports 
democracy promotion on the grounds that “democratic states are less likely to threaten 
our interests and more likely to cooperate with the U.S. to meet security threats”.61 
Equally, Bush‟s 2006 National Security Strategy posits that, “because free nations 
tend toward peace, the advance of liberty will make America more secure.”62 
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Critics argue that the Bush doctrine is different because of its supposed reliance on 
military force to achieve its objectives. David Hendrickson and Robert Tucker 
contend that the doctrine is insupportable because of the “junction it postulates 
between freedom and force.”63 However, the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq 
signify the persistence of an interventionist trend in American foreign policy. The 
United States, as Robert Kagan notes, has launched no less than nine major military 
interventions overseas during the past two decades.
64
 Indeed, it can be reasonably 
argued that Bush has employed American military power with more caution than did 
his immediate predecessor. As Andrew Bacevich puts it, during the Clinton years 
“U.S. military forces marched hither and yon, intervening in a wider variety of places, 
for a wider variety of purposes than at any time in our history.”65 
 
Ultimately, the Clinton and Bush doctrines both demonstrate the enduring influence 
of American nationalism on United States foreign policy. Both consider American 
democratic ideals to be universally applicable and both believe that America has an 
exceptional role in promoting those ideals abroad. In seeking to spread democracy, 
Clinton and Bush therefore appeal to one of the oldest traditions in American foreign 
policy. As Clinton himself put it, “A pro-democracy foreign policy is neither liberal 
nor conservative; neither Democrat nor Republican; it is a deep American tradition.”66 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
PREVENTIVE WAR 
 
 
3.1 Prevention and Preemption 
 
It is important to clarify the distinction between the concepts of prevention and 
preemption. In articulating America‟s response to 9/11, the Bush administration 
employed the two terms on an almost interchangeable basis, while much of the 
ensuing scholarly analysis of the Bush doctrine is also guilty of conflating the terms; 
consequently, the distinction between prevention and preemption has been distorted 
and is worth reiterating. The U.S. Department of Defense defines preemption as “an 
attack initiated on the basis of incontrovertible evidence that an enemy attack is 
imminent.”67 Conversely, preventive action is “initiated in the belief that military 
conflict, while not imminent, is inevitable, and that to delay would involve great 
risk.”68  
 
The paradigmatic examples of preemptive and preventive military force are the Six-
Day War of 1967 and the 1981 Israeli attack on Iraq‟s Osirak nuclear reactor.69 The 
Six-Day War is an example of preemption because Israel‟s actions were in response 
to “an imminent threat – most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air 
forces preparing to attack.”70 In contrast, Israel‟s strike on Iraqi nuclear facilities in 
1981, and for that matter its more recent attack on Syria‟s clandestine nuclear 
programme, are illustrations of preventive force because they were intended to 
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eradicate more distant threats. In affirming that the United States “will act 
against…emerging threats before they are fully formed,”71 the Bush administration 
evidently supports a policy of prevention. 
 
 
3.2 The Logic of Prevention 
 
This tenet of the Bush doctrine should be interpreted as a strategic response to the 
potential interaction between three agents: international terrorism, rogue states, and 
WMD proliferation; what Timothy Lynch and Robert Singh term the “three Ts nexus” 
of terrorism, tyranny, and technology.
72
 President Bush outlined the nature of this 
threat in his 2003 State of the Union address: “Today, the gravest danger…facing 
America and the world is outlaw regimes that seek and possess nuclear, chemical, and 
biological weapons. These regimes could use such weapons for blackmail, terror, and 
mass murder. They could also give or sell those weapons to terrorist allies”.73 The 
Bush administration posits that the gravity of this threat necessitates a proactive 
strategic approach. For Bush, “the only path to safety is the path of action.”74 
 
The dangers present at the “perilous crossroads of radicalism and technology”75 did 
not suddenly emerge on 9/11; rather, the threat had steadily escalated throughout the 
1990s. Indeed it was President Clinton who originally warned of the threats posed by 
the three Ts nexus. The Clinton administration‟s 1998 National Security Strategy for a 
New Century, for example, reasoned that WMD proliferation is the “greatest potential 
threat to global stability and security” because it “threatens to provide rogue states, 
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terrorists and international crime organizations the means to inflict terrible damage on 
the United States”.76  
 
It required an event of the magnitude of September 11, however, to expose the 
inadequacy of a reactive approach. The terrorist attacks, as Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice put it, “crystallized” American vulnerability.77 The Bush 
administration contends that deterrence will not work “against shadowy terrorist 
networks with no nation or citizens to defend”78, while containment may fail “when 
unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on 
missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies.”79 Accordingly, Bush sanctions a 
strategy of “anticipatory self-defense”80 whereby America “must take the battle to the 
enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge.”81 The 
logic of prevention is delineated in the 2002 NSS: “The greater the threat, the greater 
is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory 
action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the 
enemy‟s attack.”82 Ultimately, the Bush doctrine validates a strategy of prevention on 
the basis that America faces an “imminent, multifaceted, undeterrable, and potentially 
calamitous threat”.83 
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Some would argue that prevention has replaced containment and deterrence as the 
focal point of American grand strategy, thus denoting a fundamental rupture with past 
practice. Schlesinger argued that the Bush doctrine signifies a “revolutionary change” 
in American strategic thinking because it supposedly postulates that war, rather than 
being a “matter of last resort”, is now a “matter of presidential choice.”84 Similarly, 
Arnold Offner characterises preventive war as an “extremely radical and dangerous 
departure from acceptable norms”85, while Daalder and Lindsay contend that Bush 
has “abandoned a decades-long consensus that put deterrence and containment at the 
heart of American foreign policy.”86 
 
This overstates the centrality of preventive war in current American grand strategy. 
The policy of prevention does not replace the established policies of deterrence and 
containment; it supplements them in order to meet a new threat. As Condoleezza Rice 
reasoned, the Bush doctrine does not “overturn five decades of doctrine and jettison 
either containment or deterrence.”87 Indeed prevention serves as a “higher form of 
deterrence” because it aims to “deter states not from using weapons of mass 
destruction but from acquiring them in the first place.”88 Prevention is therefore an 
extension, rather than a rejection, of containment and deterrence. 
 
Bush‟s critics also exaggerate the scope of preventive war in current American 
foreign policy. As Colin Powell noted, discussion of prevention “takes up just two 
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sentences”89 in the eight sections of the 2002 NSS. Despite claims that prevention is 
now the “centerpiece of U.S. national-security policy”90, the 2003 Iraq war remains 
the Bush administration‟s only practical application of preventive war, while 
containment and deterrence continue to dictate American strategy toward Pyongyang 
and Tehran. As Gerard Alexander argues, the Bush doctrine “does not suggest that all, 
most, or even many threats should be dealt with preventively.”91 In fact, the Bush 
administration is clear that preventive military action is a last resort. The 2006 NSS 
states that America “will not resort to force in all cases to preempt emerging threats. 
Our preference is that nonmilitary actions succeed.”92 Prevention should therefore be 
recognised as a policy of limited scope intended to complement existing strategies. 
 
3.3 Prevention in Historical Perspective 
 
Jack Levy succinctly defines the strategic rationale of prevention as “better now than 
later.”93 Despite the furore over the Iraq invasion, military conflicts initiated on these 
grounds are not a recent development. As Paul Schroeder argues, “preventive 
wars…are not extreme anomalies in politics…They are a normal, even common, tool 
of statecraft.”94 Preventive logic has been strikingly influential in shaping past U.S. 
grand strategy. For Marc Trachtenberg, concerns about “what might happen if nothing 
were done”95 have informed American policy since the beginning of the Cold War. 
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Thus, in affirming that the United States will act preventively if necessary, Bush was 
“echoing an old tradition rather than establishing a new one.”96  
 
The clearest example of preventive strategic logic in Cold War American foreign 
policy is the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Kennedy administration‟s naval blockade 
strategy was in essence a preventive measure because its objective was to forestall a 
balance of power shift in favour of the Soviet Union, rather than avert an imminent 
attack on American soil. As President John F. Kennedy put it on October 22 1962: 
“We no longer live in a world where only the actual firing of weapons represents a 
sufficient challenge to a nation‟s security to constitute maximum peril. Nuclear 
weapons are so destructive and ballistic missiles are so swift that any substantially 
increased possibility of their use…may well be regarded as a definite threat to 
peace.”97 Kennedy‟s remarks effectively capture the logic of prevention that informs 
the Bush doctrine: specifically that, in a nuclear age, the United States must act before 
threats emerge and escalate. 
 
The concept of prevention reappeared during the Ronald Reagan years. While direct 
preventive action against the Soviet Union was justifiably deemed impractical, the 
Reagan administration contemplated a proactive approach toward fighting terrorism 
following the 1983 terrorist attacks on the U.S. embassy and army barracks in Beirut. 
On June 24 1984, President Reagan‟s Secretary of State George Shultz declared, “It is 
time to think long, hard, and seriously about active means of defense – about defense 
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through appropriate „preventive or preemptive actions‟ against terrorists before they 
strike.”98  
 
Shultz‟s premise – that the United States must be proactive in defeating terrorism - 
has shaped American grand strategy during the Clinton and Bush years. In June 1995, 
Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 39, a document that endorses 
America‟s right to use preemptive and preventive action against terrorist groups. It 
states that the U.S. will “give the highest priority to developing effective capabilities 
to detect, prevent, defeat, and manage the consequences of nuclear, biological or 
chemical (NBC) materials or weapons use by terrorists. The acquisition of weapons of 
mass destruction by a terrorist group, through theft or manufacture, is unacceptable. 
There is no higher priority than preventing the acquisition of this capability from 
terrorist groups potentially opposed to the U.S.”99 PDD-39 also declares that the 
United States shall “pursue vigorously efforts to deter and preempt”100 terrorist 
attacks.  
 
The Clinton administration restated a policy of anticipatory self-defence in 2000: “As 
long as terrorists continue to target American citizens, we reserve the right to act in 
self-defense by striking at their bases and those who sponsor, assist, or actively 
support them, as we have done over the years in different countries.”101 Furthermore, 
the Democratic Party‟s 2000 presidential platform proclaimed a strategy of preventive 
military intervention, euphemistically entitled „forward engagement,” in which the 
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United States should address “problems early in their development before they 
become crises”.102    
 
Clinton‟s commitment to preventive action was almost put into practice during the 
1994 North Korean nuclear crisis, when the Clinton administration formulated plans 
to launch preventive strikes against North Korean military facilities after diplomatic 
efforts failed to deter Pyongyang‟s nuclear aspirations.103 While Clinton avoided 
conflict with North Korea, the 1994 Agreed Framework accord was, as Keir Lieber 
and Robert Lieber contend, negotiated under the threat of American military force.
104
 
These examples of preventive logic in past U.S. security policy illustrate the 
considerable degree of thematic continuity, not only between Bush and Clinton, but 
also Bush and the broader traditions of American strategic thinking. 
  
 
3.4 The Case of Iraq 
 
The 2003 Iraq war, as the Bush administration‟s first, and thus far only, practical 
application of preventive military force, is central to any discussion of the Bush 
doctrine. Some critics of the war suggest that the decision to depose Saddam Hussein 
is attributable to the neoconservative influence on the Bush administration. Halper 
and Clarke argue that the neoconservatives manipulated the events of 9/11 in order to 
fulfil a “preexisting agenda” of attacking Iraq.105 Others contend that the war was 
unnecessary because containment and deterrence remained effective instruments for 
managing Saddam‟s regime. For instance, John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt claim 
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that the war lacked a “compelling strategic rationale” because past American-Iraqi 
relations indicate that Saddam Hussein was “eminently deterrable.”106  
 
An examination of U.S. Iraq policy since the Gulf War, however, reveals the 
inevitability of the Bush administration‟s decision to remove Saddam from power. 
The 1990s witnessed the gradual erosion and eventual collapse of the American 
containment strategy.
107
 By the end of the decade, the sanctions regime had, as Arthur 
Herman notes, “become a joke, proving less of a liability to Saddam than an asset in 
rebuilding his power.”108 Consequently, Washington was presented with two options: 
deterrence or regime change.
109
 President Clinton, in signing the Iraq Liberation Act 
of 1998, opted for the latter. As Kenneth Pollack argues, Clinton “concluded that the 
only solution to the problem posed by Saddam Hussein was to topple his regime.”110 
Martin Indyk, Clinton‟s principal advisor on Iraq, outlined the administration‟s 
commitment to regime change: “Our purpose is deliberate: it is to establish clearly 
and unequivocally that the current regime in Iraq is a criminal regime, beyond the 
pale of international society and, in our judgement, irredeemable.”111 
 
America was therefore obligated to seek regime change in Iraq before Bush entered 
the White House. Both Clinton and Bush agreed that the removal of Saddam was the 
only solution to what Hyland terms the “perpetual state of belligerency”112 between 
Washington and Baghdad. Crucially, 9/11 compelled the Bush administration to move 
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beyond a rhetorical commitment to regime change. Donald Rumsfeld detailed the 
rationale for war when he reasoned that America “did not act in Iraq because we had 
discovered dramatic new evidence of Iraq‟s pursuit of WMD; we acted because we 
saw the existing evidence in a new light – through the prism of our experience on 
9/11.”113  
 
Thus, Bush did not invade Iraq because Saddam posed an imminent threat to 
America; rather, he acted because 9/11 magnified a potentially catastrophic threat that 
already existed. The Bush administration‟s mindset prior to war was illustrated by 
Vice President Dick Cheney‟s comment that the “risks of inaction are far greater than 
the risk of action.”114 What if Saddam acquired a nuclear weapon and cooperated with 
a terrorist group to attack the United States? This essentially preventive logic 
explicates the Bush administration‟s decision to effect regime change in Iraq. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
UNILATERALISM 
 
 
4.1 Multilateralism or Unilateralism: A False Dichotomy 
 
President Bush avows that he “will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary,”115 to 
prevent terrorist attacks against the United States: “All free nations have a stake in 
preventing sudden and catastrophic attacks…Yet the course of this nation does not 
depend on the decisions of others. Whatever action is required, whenever action is 
necessary, I will defend the freedom and security of the American people.”116 Thus, 
the Bush administration asserts that, while it will seek the support of allies, it will not 
permit others to hinder its capacity to protect American interests. 
 
Some argue that Bush‟s firm rhetoric on collective action constitutes the emergence of 
a unilateralist grand strategy. For Jean-Marc Coicaud, the Bush doctrine signifies a 
dramatic shift from the “international solidarity” of the 1990s to an “unabashed 
embrace of a unilateralist foreign policy”.117 Similarly, G. John Ikenberry accuses 
Bush of a “sharp unilateral turn” in American security policy: “A half century of U.S. 
leadership in constructing an international order around multilateral institutions, rule-
based agreements, and alliance partnerships seems to be giving way to a new assertive 
– even defiant – unilateralism.”118  
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These arguments are flawed in two respects: they overstate past American 
commitment to multilateral procedure, and they misinterpret the current 
administration‟s willingness to act alone as a preference for unilateralism. As 
Podhoretz notes, in articulating America‟s response to 9/11, Bush “did not say…that 
he would act unilaterally, or that he would pay no attention to the opinions or our 
allies, or that he would ignore the UN.”119 Indeed the Bush administration clearly 
recognises that collective action furthers American interests: “We are…guided by the 
conviction that no nation can build a safer, better world alone. Alliances and 
multilateral institutions can multiply the strength of freedom-loving nations.”120  
 
The Iraq war is often cited as evidence of American unilateralism. Stanley Hoffman 
characterises the invasion as a “unilateral action” that has weakened “established 
international principles of deterrence, nonintervention and international authorization 
of military action”.121 For Dombrowski and Payne, Bush presents a “serious threat to 
ongoing multilateralism” by “acting alone and against the wishes of the international 
community” in Iraq.122 However, is the Iraq war truly an example of U.S. 
unilateralism? If one employs the established definition of multilateralism as the 
“cooperation of three or more states in a given area of international relations,”123 then 
the 2003 invasion, supported by a coalition of around forty nations, is patently an 
illustration of collective action.  
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Indeed, the conduct of Saddam Hussein can more accurately be described as 
unilateral. As The Economist noted in 2002, the Iraqi dictator, by consistently flouting 
multilateral procedure for decades, was a flagrant unilateralist.
124
 By bringing about 
regime change in Baghdad, Bush was acting upon Iraqi non-compliance with a raft of 
UN Security Council resolutions; and so arguably defending the principles of 
international law that the president‟s doubters claim he has irrevocably weakened. 
Ironically, by persistently overlooking Saddam‟s contempt for international law, 
nations such as France and Germany undermined the system of multilateral 
diplomacy they purport to uphold. As Pollack argues, “members of the international 
community who bleat about the importance of collective security, multilateral 
diplomacy, and international law…gravely weakened all three…by allowing Iraq to 
flout them”.125 
 
The debate over Iraq exposes the false dichotomy between “unilateralism” and 
“multilateralism”. Characterisations of the Bush doctrine as unilateral ignore the 
complex nature of the U.S. foreign policy-making process. As Philip Zelikow argues, 
“The cartoon version of America‟s international policy dilemma poses a choice 
between unilateralism versus multilateralism, the wild cowboy versus the cooperative 
diplomat. This depiction is false.”126 Crude caricatures of “cowboy diplomacy”127 
imply that an American president must adopt an exclusively multilateral or unilateral 
approach; rather, U.S. grand strategy invariably amalgamates both in a manner that 
best advances American interests. “The choice is not between unilateralism and 
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multilateralism,” argues Stewart Patrick, “but among variants of the latter.”128 In 
accepting the need for multilateral diplomacy, while prohibiting others from 
encumbering American freedom of action, Bush‟s approach is entirely congruous 
with past U.S. foreign policy.   
 
 
4.2 Selective Multilateralism 
 
Despite protestations over the Bush doctrine, unilateralism is not a novel concept in 
American foreign policy. For Gaddis, the notion that America “could not rely upon 
the goodwill of others to secure its safety, and therefore should be prepared to act on 
its own,” shaped U.S. foreign relations during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries.
129
 Accordingly, in proclaiming the United States‟ right to act alone, Bush‟s 
strategy signals a “return to an old position, not the emergence of a new one.”130 
 
Some suggest that Bush has renounced the multilateral world order that emerged after 
the Second World War. Hendrickson and Tucker argue that Bush has abandoned the 
commitment to “consensual modes of decision-making” that supposedly characterised 
U.S. foreign policy throughout the second half of the twentieth century.
131
 However, 
unilateralist strategies were not discarded during the Cold War. Certainly the United 
States was instrumental in the formation of multilateral institutions such as the UN 
and NATO; yet this did not prevent successive American presidents bypassing the 
will of the “international community” when U.S. interests were at stake. As Robert 
Kagan puts it, “the notion that Washington tried hard to abide by the UN Charter and 
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“pledged” its power “to international law” is ahistorical, even fanciful.”132 U.S. State 
Department records indicate that, during the Eisenhower years, it was determined that 
America should “act independently of its major allies when the advantage of 
achieving U.S. objectives by such action clearly outweighs the danger of lasting 
damage to its alliances.”133 This statement encapsulates the American Cold War 
attitude toward multilateralism: specifically, that the United States values 
international alliances, unless they conflict with U.S. interests.  
 
The Bush doctrine, in placing American interests ahead of multilateral procedure, is 
consistent with U.S. Cold War strategy. Others suggest Bush‟s approach departs from 
American policy during the Clinton years. Judis argues that Bush has rejected the 
“Wilsonian internationalism” of the 1990s in favour of a unilateral imperialism, citing 
the administration‟s withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty and its rejection 
of the Kyoto Protocol as evidence of this strategic shift.
134
 However, Judis‟ analysis 
fails to recognise that Bush‟s repudiation of these international agreements is rooted 
in the actions of his immediate predecessor. As Renshon points out, few critics 
acknowledge that it was Clinton who initiated the ABM treaty withdrawal process, or 
that Clinton deliberately failed to submit the Kyoto accords for Senate ratification.
135
 
 
Despite an early rhetorical commitment to a policy of “assertive multilateralism,” 
Clinton did not deviate markedly from the pragmatic approach to collective action 
that typified Cold War American foreign policy. The 1993 Somalia intervention led to 
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the release of Presidential Decision Directive 25 in May 1994; a document that, as 
Robert DiPrizio notes, signalled the Clinton administration‟s retreat from its previous 
support for multilateral UN peacekeeping operations.
136
 Clinton‟s stance on 
multilateralism, as enunciated in PDD-25, is remarkably similar to the practical 
approach adopted by Bush: “The U.S. will maintain the capability to act unilaterally 
or in coalitions when our most significant interests…are at stake. Multilateral peace 
operations must, therefore, be placed in proper perspective among the instruments of 
U.S. foreign policy.”137 
 
During his second term, Clinton maintained America‟s right to act unilaterally. The 
1998 NSS declared that the United States “must always be prepared to act alone when 
that is our most advantageous course.”138 Clinton‟s final NSS, released in 2000, 
reiterated his willingness to act independent of America‟s allies: “We act in alliance 
or partnership when others share our interests, but will act unilaterally when 
compelling national interests so demand.”139 Thus, like Bush, Clinton recognised the 
value of collective action in promoting American aims, but did not renounce the right 
to act alone if U.S. interests were at risk. Walt offers an accurate assessment of 
Clinton‟s approach to multilateralism when he writes that the president “acted 
precisely as one would expect from the leader of the world‟s largest power – relying 
on international institutions when they suit U.S. purposes but criticizing or ignoring 
them when they do not.”140 
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The accusations levelled at Bush of a radical unilateralism are, in the words of 
Bacevich, “largely fanciful.”141 There is significant continuity between Clinton and 
Bush on the issue of multilateral diplomacy: both understood the importance of 
collective action in furthering U.S. goals; while neither relinquished the right to act 
unilaterally if it was in America‟s interests to do so. Ultimately, Madeline Albright‟s 
dictum of “multilateral when you can, unilateral when you must” most accurately 
characterises grand strategy under Clinton and Bush. Moreover, this selective 
approach to multilateralism – what Richard Haass terms “multilateralism à la carte”142 
– is wholly consistent with American foreign policy throughout the Cold War. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
AMERICAN HEGEMONY 
 
 
5.1 Hegemony or Empire? 
 
The final tenet, and overarching objective, of the Bush doctrine is the consolidation of 
U.S. global preeminence: “America has, and intends to keep, military strengths 
beyond challenge – thereby making the destabilizing arms races of other eras 
pointless, and limiting rivalries to trade and other pursuits of peace.”143 Thus, the 
Bush administration posits that the security of the United States is contingent upon a 
stable and open international order sustained by American leadership. As 
Condoleezza Rice declared, “Dissuading military competition can prevent potential 
conflict and costly global arms races.”144 
 
Some argue that the quest to strengthen U.S. hegemony denotes the existence of an 
American empire. Shortly after 9/11, Boot argued that the attacks were attributable to 
“insufficient American involvement and ambition” overseas; consequently, for Boot, 
the solution was for America to “embrace its imperial role” and pursue a more 
“expansive” and “assertive” foreign policy.145 Others are less sympathetic to the 
notion of an American empire. Noam Chomsky believes that the Bush doctrine is an 
“imperial grand strategy” designed to secure “unilateral world domination through 
absolute moral superiority”146. For Patrick Buchanan, Bush has embraced a “neo-
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imperial foreign policy that would have been seen by the Founding Fathers as a 
breach of faith.”147  
 
While Boot, Chomsky, and Buchanan differ wildly in their interpretations of 
American foreign policy, they are each equally mistaken in applying the term empire 
to the United States. The use of this term in the context of American foreign relations 
is, as Mandelbaum argues, both inaccurate and pejorative.
148
 Instead, the term 
hegemon more appropriately describes America‟s current status in the international 
order. For Niall Ferguson, this label is “merely a euphemism for empire”149. However, 
the difference between the two terms is “no simple semantic distinction”.150 Paul 
Schroeder reasons that “empire means political control exercised by one organized 
political unit over another unit separate from and alien to it. Many factors enter into 
empire…but the essential core is political: the possession of final authority by one 
entity over the vital political decisions of another.”151 In contrast, hegemony refers to 
“clear, acknowledged leadership and dominant influence by one unit within a 
community of units not under a single authority. A hegemon is first among equals; an 
imperial power rules over subordinates.”152 
 
Thus, hegemony and empire are not synonymous terms; rather, they reflect two 
fundamentally different types of inter-state relationship. While the U.S. is the world‟s 
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most powerful nation, it does not possess final political authority over other states. 
America, as Zelikow reasons, “is central in world politics today, not omnipotent.”153 
The term empire is therefore not applicable to the United States. As Krauthammer 
suggests, “It is absurd to apply the word to a people whose first instinct upon arriving 
on anyone‟s soil is to demand an exit strategy.”154 Others argue that America is a 
unique empire, qualitatively different from past imperial powers but an empire 
nonetheless. Schlesinger, for instance, asked, “Who can doubt that there is an 
American empire? – an „informal‟ empire, not colonial in polity, but still richly 
equipped with imperial paraphernalia”.155 This argument is unconvincing: the United 
States is either an imperial power or it is not. As Gary Schmitt notes, the fact that 
America “is not an empire in the traditional sense seems to suggest that the country is 
not, in fact, an empire.”156 
 
The Bush doctrine does not call for the construction of an American imperium. When 
Bush stated that the United States “has no empire to extend or utopia to establish,”157 
the president offered an accurate and honest portrayal of American strategic intent: 
specifically, that a liberal international order maintained by U.S. leadership is 
conducive to American interests. By asserting U.S. primacy, the Bush administration 
seeks security, not empire: “The Bush doctrine was not proposed to support a pax 
America. It was not proposed to acquire an empire. It was proposed to protect the 
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United States from leaders and groups who would like to inflict catastrophic harm on 
this country, and had already demonstrated the desire, intention, and will to do so.”158 
 
 
5.2 The Pursuit of American Hegemony 
 
Critics argue that Bush‟s strategy of “dissuading potential competitors”159 through the 
preservation of American hegemony deviates from past American policy. Daalder and 
Lindsay assert that Bush has “rejected many of the assumptions that had guided 
Washington‟s approach to foreign affairs for more than half a century” by employing 
a “hegemonist” foreign policy informed by the belief that “America‟s immense power 
and the willingness to wield it…is the key to securing America‟s interests in the 
world.”160 For Mann, the Bush doctrine signifies “an epochal change, the flowering of 
a new view of America‟s status and role in the world” in which the United States is 
able to pursue its objectives without making “compromises or accommodations” due 
to its vast military power.
161
 
 
However, the notion that American security is enhanced by the expansion of U.S. 
power overseas has been an elemental theme in America‟s foreign policy since the 
nation‟s formative years. For Boot, U.S. foreign engagement during the nineteenth 
century was driven by an expansionist desire to extend American continental 
hegemony.
162
 Similarly, Gaddis argues that the United States has always favoured a 
“preponderance of power” over a “balance of power”, suggesting that, “had John 
Quincy Adams lived to see the end of the Cold War, he would not have found the 
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position of the United States within the international system an unfamiliar one.”163 
Thus, in seeking to augment American hegemony, the Bush doctrine restates an 
established trend in U.S. grand strategy. 
 
The pursuit of security through expansion was fundamental to Cold War American 
foreign policy. In 1950, Paul Nitze, the archetypal Cold Warrior, wrote that the 
“United States and the Soviet Union are engaged in a struggle for preponderant 
power…[T]o seek less than preponderant power would be to opt for defeat. 
Preponderant power must be the objective of U.S. policy.”164 NSC-68 also recognised 
the imperative of American global engagement: “In a shrinking world…it is not an 
adequate objective merely to seek to check the Kremlin design, for the absence of 
order among nations is becoming less and less tolerable. This fact imposes on us, in 
our own interests, the responsibility of world leadership.”165 The Bush doctrine, as a 
strategy informed by the idea that American security “is tightly bound up with the 
security of the broader international system,”166 represents a continuation of the 
internationalist consensus evident in American foreign policy since the early 1940s. 
 
American strategic objectives did not change dramatically after the Cold War. Indeed 
the collapse of the Soviet Union provided U.S. policymakers with the opportunity to 
expand American power further. “By removing the only real check on U.S. power,” 
argues Christopher Layne, “the Soviet Union‟s demise presented the United States 
with the opportunity to use its capabilities to exert more control over – to “shape” – 
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the international political system and simultaneously to increase its power.”167 The 
desire to protect U.S. hegemony has therefore informed American grand strategy 
since the end of the Cold War. As Bacevich notes, American strategic thinking during 
the 1990s dictated that Washington acquire not “military strength” but “military 
supremacy,” whereby America possesses “military capabilities enabling it to prevail 
over any conceivable combination of adversaries.”168  
 
Consequently, the Bush administration inherited this tenet of the Bush doctrine from 
its immediate predecessor. In 1992, the U.S. Defense Department drafted the Defense 
Planning Guidance (DPG), which stated that America‟s post-Cold War mission must 
be to convince “potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or 
pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests.”169 While the 
hard-nosed rhetoric was moderated in subsequent drafts, the Clinton administration, 
as Lieber and Lieber note, did not discard the concept of preserving American 
preeminence.
170
 Clinton‟s 1995 NSS acknowledged the importance of American 
global leadership, stating that, “as the world‟s premier economic and military power, 
and with the strength of our democratic values, the U.S. is indispensable to the 
forging of stable political relations and open trade.”171 Equally, the 1997 Quadrennial 
Defense Review endorsed the consolidation of U.S. hegemony, declaring that the 
United States must “sustain American global leadership” by denying the emergence 
of potential rival powers.
172
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Certainly the Bush administration has been uncompromising in its foreign policy 
rhetoric since 9/11. However, this indicates more a change in style than substance.  
President Clinton did not deny the fact of American preeminence, and nor did he 
reject the premise that American global leadership is conducive to a stable world 
order. As Suedfeld notes, “The real source of acrimony, both in the U.S. and abroad, 
seems to be that President Bush is unapologetic and straightforward” about the 
assertion of American hegemony.
173
 However, Bush has essentially maintained the 
strategic approach of the previous administration. As Bacevich argues, “although the 
rhetoric changed, the overarching grand strategy – aimed at creating an open and 
integrated international order dominated by the United States – emerged from the 
transfer of power intact.”174 
 
Crucially, therefore, 9/11 had little impact on the overall direction of American 
foreign policy. Bush was committed to preserving American preeminence prior to the 
terrorist attacks: while he spoke of a “humble” foreign policy before September 2001, 
Bush also outlined a “vision in which no great power, or coalition of great powers, 
dominates or endangers our friends. In which America encourages stability from a 
position of strength.”175 The foremost consequence of 9/11 for American foreign 
policy, therefore, was to simply encourage the Bush administration to pursue more 
vigorously the approach of its predecessors. The attacks, as Robert Kagan argues, 
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“shifted and accelerated but did not fundamentally alter a course the United States 
was already on.”176 
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CONCLUSION 
 
It has been reasoned that “we need to invoke the past to make sense of the present and 
to imagine the future.”177 This statement is particularly pertinent to the study of 
United States foreign policy since 9/11. Rather than presiding over a revolution in 
American grand strategy, George W. Bush has merely invoked the policies of the 
past.  
 
This study demonstrates the significant degree of thematic continuity between the 
Clinton and Bush doctrines and, in a broader historical context, the Bush doctrine and 
American grand strategy during the Cold War. Each tenet of Bush‟s national security 
strategy has influenced past U.S. foreign policy. For example, the postulation that 
American security is advanced through the spread of democracy overseas has 
informed U.S. foreign engagement since the nation‟s formative years. Furthermore, in 
considering democratic ideals to be both superior and universally applicable, the Bush 
doctrine illustrates the continuing influence of the American national identity on U.S. 
foreign policy. 
 
Nor does Bush‟s prevention strategy depart from past practice. Although the centrality 
of this policy to current U.S. foreign policy is often overstated, the logic of prevention 
– that it is prudent to act sooner rather than later – shaped American strategic thinking 
before 9/11. Equally, characterisations of the Bush doctrine as “unilateral” are crude 
and inaccurate. In demonstrating a preference for multilateralism, but also a 
willingness to act alone if necessary, Bush conforms to past practice. 
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The Bush administration‟s pursuit of American global hegemony has motivated U.S. 
foreign policy since the beginning of the Cold War. In subscribing to the view that 
American global leadership and the expansion of American power overseas are 
beneficial to U.S. security, Bush has simply reaffirmed the policies of his 
predecessors. Ultimately, the Bush doctrine, as a grand strategy that seeks to balance 
American ideals and interests, is wholly consistent with the U.S. strategic tradition. 
 
Moreover, the Bush doctrine‟s aim of maintaining America‟s geopolitical 
preeminence should be encouraged. The editors of Foreign Policy succinctly summed 
up attitudes to U.S. hegemony when they stated, “Either you believe that Uncle Sam 
is a benevolent bulwark against chaos or you see him as the all-powerful root of evil.” 
178
 Those who subscribe to the latter view should consider the alternatives to assertive 
American global leadership. It is fashionable to criticise Bush‟s foreign policy as 
arrogant and hubristic; yet a return to multipolarity would signify the emergence of a 
volatile and dangerous international system hostile to democratic values. As a recent 
Spectator editorial put it, a multipolar international order “would not be a Kantian 
paradise but a Hobbesian jungle.”179 Resolute American leadership was essential in 
defeating the two greatest evils of the twentieth century in Nazism and Communism; 
it will be equally instrumental in managing the threats of this century.  
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